so necessary to legitimate our actions, as that without that formality our resolutions to maintain the truth of God on all hazards, in a private capacity, were unlawful in the court of God and nature: but, on the contrary, must judge that their relinquishing or opposing their duty, which before God they are obliged to maintain, preserve, and promove, is so far from loosing our obligation, or exeeming us from our duty that it should rather press us to prosecute it with the more vigour, without suspending it upon their precedency. For now they can pretend to no precedency, when they do not answer the end of their own private advantage, they cease to be the ministers of God and of the people, and become private persons. And reason will conclude, 'That when the Ephori or trustees betray their trust, and sell, or basely give away the liberties and privileges of the people, which they were entrusted with, the people cannot be brought into a remediless condition; if a tutor waste and destroy the pupils estate, the law provides a remedy for the pupil, Jus popu. vind. cap. 15. page 335, 336.' 'The remedy, in this case, can only be, as every one must move in his own sphere, while all concur in the same duty; so if any, in higher place, become not only remiss, but according to the influence of their power would seduce others into their apostasy, it is their duty to resist and endeavour their reformation or removal: and if these more eminently entrusted shall turn directly apostates, and obstructive and destructive to common interests, the people of an inferior degree may step forward to occupy the places, and assert the interests, which they forefault and desert. Neither is this a breach of good order; for order is only a mean subordinate to, and intended for the glory of God, and the peoples good, and the regulation thereof must only be admitted as it is conducible, and not repugnant to these ends. A general's command to his soldiers in battle, does not impede the necessity of succession, in case of vacancy of any charge, either through death or desertion, even of such as in quality may be far inferior to those whose places they step into, Naphtali, page 151. first edition.' I do not assert this for private peoples aspiring into the capacity of primores of peers; but that they may do that which the peers desert, and dare not, or will not do, if the Lord put them in a capacity to do it. And more plainly I assert, that if the peers of the land whose duty it is principally to restrain and repress tyranny, either connive at it, or concur with it, and so abandon or betray their trust, then the common people may do it; at least are obliged to renounce, reject, and disown allegiance to the tyrant, without the peers. For which I offer these reasons. 1. Because all men have as much freedom and liberty by nature as peers have, being no more slaves than they; because slavery is a penal evil contrary to nature,