(1) The peoples of distant countries did not distinguish between individual merchants. As all Chinamen look alike to us, so all Englishmen or even all Europeans were alike to them. An unscrupulous trader, who cheated, robbed, or killed a native, escaped the consequences of his crime and left them to be borne by his countrymen who sought later to carry on the trade. The home government could not punish such offences, and it could not afford to let them continue. It required, therefore, that a man proposing to trade to a distant country should have an interest in the permanent welfare of the trade, by making him contribute money to the association, and subscribe to its rules. (2) The government could diminish the risks of distant commerce by assuring merchants who spent money in building up a trade that they should not be deprived of the fruits of their labors by newcomers who had made no sacrifices. It seemed as proper to encourage in this way the investment of capital in commerce as to encourage investment in manufactures by granting patents. (3) Finally, governments were led naturally to apply the prevalent ideas of guild regulation to distant commerce, and found some practical advantages in doing this; it was easier to tax and to regulate an association of men than a number of individuals. =164. Association in the form of the regulated company.=—Many of the objects enumerated above could be obtained by union in what was called a “regulated company.” The regulated company had a monopoly of a certain field of trade, and established regulations which were binding on the members trading in that field. Every one, however, who secured admission by paying the entrance fee and promising obedience to the rules, traded thenceforth with his own capital, and kept his profits for himself; there was no pooling of capital or profits. The character of such a company may be suggested to readers by the organization of the modern stock exchange. No one who is not a member can trade on the exchange, and every member is bound to follow certain rules in his dealings, but every member keeps his capital and profits distinct from those of the others. The larger part of the early English commercial companies were regulated companies of this kind. To a certain extent they attained the objects of association which have been enumerated above; some of the worst evils of individual trade were impossible so long as the company adopted wise regulations and could force members to live up to them.