The second chapter is of Narration (διήγημα), which is distinguished from Fable as being the story of something which has either actually happened or is told as if it had. Homer and Herodotus are both “narrators.” There are five kinds of it (one thinks of Polonius)—the directly declaratory, the indirectly ditto, the elenchtic, the loose, the periodic—with examples of each kind.[130] The first is good for story, the second for debate, “the elenchtic [confuting] is rather for elenchs,” and the loose for epilogues, as being pathetic. Footnote 130: This is an early example of the confusion and cross-division which has infested formal Rhetoric to the present day. For the first three heads are purely material, the last two grammatical-formal; so that, instead of ranking side by side, _each_ of 1, 2, 3 should rank under _each_ of 4, 5. Cf. Professor Bain’s _Rhetoric_, vol. i., where similar cross-division more than once occurs. We might at very little expense of trouble, if at much of space, go through the whole of the little treatise and show how the hairy-hearted one of Tarsus deals in the same way with “Uses,”[131] Maxims, Refutation and Confirmation, Commonplace, Encomium, Comparison, Character-drawing,[132] Ecphrasis,[133] Thesis,[134] and Introduction. But the examples given will suffice. Each chapter consists of a definition, a division, sometimes very finely drawn, of kinds, examples, and generally a scrap of advice as to how, when, and where to introduce them. Footnote 131: χρεῖαι, rather “maxims” than “uses” in the theological sense. Hermogenes exhausts his special gift in distinguishing them from the more general maxim or γνώμη. Footnote 132: The ἠθοποΐια above referred to. It has a special reference to the drawing-up of speeches suitable to such and such a character in such and such a situation. Footnote 133: Description of the graphic and picturesque kind. Footnote 134: Subject or question in the wide sense.