A third point on which negotiations took place was still more urgent. The Spanish monarchy was once more collecting all its resources to send a great fleet with troops and [A.D. 1639.] the necessaries of war to the Netherlands. The Spaniards indeed boasted that they desired to chastise the insolence of the Dutch and French: but in fact they were conscious of the superiority of their adversaries. They sought to assure themselves beforehand, if not of the alliance of the English, yet at least of their protection within English waters, if disaster or too strong a resistance should drive their fleet thither. Charles I did not refuse this request, always provided that satisfaction should be done to him in return in the affair of the Palatinate, with regard to which the Spaniards made fresh proposals[147]. What injustice is done to Charles I by any one who accuses him of having negligently lost sight of the cause of his nephews! It is true that he would not draw the sword in their behalf: but they supplied the principal motive which guided him in his diplomatic transactions. His relations with the great parties and powers who were fighting for ascendancy on the Continent, were principally determined by regard for them: the ceaseless vacillation of his policy was due to nothing but the multiplicity of the circumstances which affected them. It certainly seemed that he might expect the Spaniards to do most for them; for Spain, by its influence on Austria, could act most effectually in support of the restoration of the Elector Palatine. But we know how often he had been deceived in this hope: the relation between German Austria and Bavaria especially made the designs suggested by the Spanish ambassador impracticable. Had the King been willing to give his unreserved support to the interests of Spain, which were so closely connected with those of Catholicism, he would never have effected anything. He therefore sought an alliance with the French court: the affair of the Palatinate formed the principal subject of the stipulations he made with it. But Charles I could not and dared not side unconditionally even with France: for by taking this step he would have been compelled to come to an open breach with Spain, which would have disturbed the profitable traffic of [A.D. 1639.] the English nation with the distant possessions of that monarchy: and he would thereby have promoted the general ascendancy of France, which was in the highest degree disadvantageous to the position of England. Moreover he would not even have reached his end by this path, for the final decision still rested with the Emperor.