In these embarrassments it was the policy of King Charles to make advances to those powers which were striving to resist the Austro-Spanish house, while he did not exactly make common cause with them: he hoped, as it seems, to make such use of the fluctuations of fortune and of war as to induce the Emperor himself at last, for the sake of his own interest, to grant the wished-for indulgence. The affair of the Palatinate forms as it were the woof in the web of Charles I’s history, running through it in all directions. And never at any time had it been of more importance. In one of the most remarkable entanglements of European relations, the considerations arising out of it decided his line of policy. The conquest of Breisach by Duke Bernard of Weimar in December 1638 was hailed with as much joy in England as in every other Protestant country. The establishment of this brave general on the great continental line of communication between the different parts of the Spanish monarchy, could not but determine that power to devise some way out of the difficulty. The occupation of this place too threatened Bavaria with an immediate danger, which could not fail to make an impression on the Elector Maximilian, on whom everything depended. A project was even entertained of marrying the victorious Duke of Saxe-Weimar to a princess of the Palatinate, so as to attach him as closely as possible to the interest of that family. Duke Bernard for his own part sought to make himself a little more independent of France: not that he had in view the foundation of a third party, which would have brought everything into confusion; he was only unwilling to be a vassal of France: he thought of taking his place beside that power as an independent ally. In this enterprise he had Protestant Switzerland on his side, which was very [A.D. 1639.] unwilling to see the French establish themselves in Lorraine. This design moreover exactly suited the policy of Charles I, to whom the aggrandisement of France was displeasing.