Aristotle also distinguishes a third type of finance (χρηματιστική) which shares in the nature of both those above described. It deals with natural resources and their products, but with things which, though useful, are not fruits (ἀκάρπιμα), such as wood-cutting (ὑλοτομία) and mining in all its branches (μεταλλευτική).[763] The meaning may be best apprehended if, with Ashley,[764] we observe that οἰκονομική is characterized, not only by direct acquisition of nature’s products, but also by a personal use of the same, while the unnatural finance has neither of these qualities. The medium kind, then, is like the former, in that it involves direct acquisition of natural resources, but like the latter, in that it does not acquire for directly personal use, but for exchange. It consists, therefore, not so much in the arts themselves, as in the exchange that is based on them. In the discussion of the so-called false finance, Aristotle thus reveals a markedly hostile attitude to any extensive development of exchange. The middleman is considered to be a parasite and necessarily degenerate by the very fact of his business.[765] As seen above, his criticism was doubtless directed chiefly against the mean and dishonest spirit in the actual retail trade and money-loaning of his day.[766] Yet here also, just as in the _Ethics_ passage above discussed, his prejudice blinds him to the fact that exchangers may be real producers, and that, after all, even the alleged false finance is not unlimited, but that it is distinctly bounded by economic demand.[767] Still worse, he includes hired labor of every kind under unlimited acquisition, merely because it has some of the other qualities of that type of economy, though it certainly does not tend to unlimited enrichment even as much as agriculture.[768] However, he should be given credit of being a forerunner of the modern humanitarian economy, which insists that the final goal of all economics should be proper consumption, and that acquisition must be relegated to its true place as a means, the supreme end being human welfare.[769] POPULATION Aristotle exhibits an interest in the problem of population in relation to subsistence in his criticism of Plato for limiting the amount of property and making it indivisible, while failing to provide against a too high birth-rate.[770] He states the principle that, if property is to be limited, there must be a corresponding limitation on the increase of population,[771] and that the let-alone policy must be followed by increased poverty.[772] He therefore criticizes the Spartan law, for encouraging the largest possible families.[773] It is evident, however, that, as in the case of Plato, his interest in the problem is prompted chiefly by a moral and political motive. It arises merely from his desire to limit individual acquisition, in a small state, artificially constructed, and is to him in no sense a question of world food-supply.[774]