During the colonial era the broad outlines and essential principles of the American divorce law, as it still exists in the various states, had already taken form. Long before the Revolution it was predetermined that a free and tolerant policy in this regard must prevail in the United States. The task of the legislator during the century following the birth of the nation has, in general, consisted in effecting a further liberalization in the causes of divorce; while at the same time the details of the system have been gradually wrought out. At the close of the period one finds much more elaborate and careful provisions regarding causes, residence, notice, alimony and property than at the beginning. An attempt will be made in this chapter to sketch the course of legislation in all of the states during a hundred and twenty-five years. Necessarily only the more salient features can be brought out. The beginning and the end, with some of the more important intervening changes, may be dwelt upon. The immense volume of laws, the constant stream of legislative enactments, the ceaseless tinkering of the statute-maker, the wearisome repetitions, render anything more than this very difficult and perhaps unnecessary. The most that one can hope for is to make the right impression; to disclose the true perspective by a judicious selection and grouping of the materials. _a_) _Jurisdiction; causes and kinds of divorce._--Through their silence on the subject nearly all of the first state constitutions left the power of granting divorces in the hands of the legislative bodies. In Massachusetts, however, the practice of the provincial period was temporarily continued. "All causes of marriage, divorce, and alimony," declares the constitution of 1780, "shall be heard by the Governor and Council, until the Legislature shall by law make other provision."[1] Such provision was made in 1786. Yet six years thereafter Governor Hancock is obliged to return to the senate unsigned a bill "for dissolving the bond of matrimony between Daniel Chickering and Abigail his wife," remarking that it is unconstitutional and the proposed divorce is for a cause for which by law only a separation _a mensa et thoro_ may be granted.[2] By the act of 1786 all questions of divorce and alimony are referred to the "Supreme Judicial Court holden for the County where the parties live," and its decrees are final.[3] Here the jurisdiction remained until 1887, when it was vested in the superior court with appeal to the first-named tribunal; and the power to hear petitions for separate maintenance and for the care, custody, education, and support of minor children was given to the courts of probate in the several counties.[4] [1] _Const. of Mass._ (1780), chap. 3. [2] For the document containing this veto see _Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Mass._ (1790-91: reprinted by the secretary of state, Boston, 1895), 575, 576.