A History of Mediaeval Jewish PhilosophyHusik, Isaac
ReligionJewish
A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy
Husik, Isaac
Philosophy, Jewish; Philosophy, Medieval
His refutation of the "accident" or "mixture" theory of the soul, as
well as the subsequent discussion of the various functions, sensuous and
rational, of the tripartite soul, are based upon Ibn Sina's treatment of
the same topic, and we have already reproduced some of it in our
exposition of Judah Halevi. We shall therefore be brief here and refer
only to such aspects as are new in Ibn Daud, or such as we found it
advisable to omit in our previous expositions.
His main argument against the materialistic or mechanistic theory of the
soul is that while a number of phenomena of the growing animal body can
be explained by reference to the form of the mixture in the elementary
qualities, not all aspects can be thus explained. Its growth and general
formation may be the result of material and mechanical causes, but not
so the design and purpose evident in the similarity, to the smallest
detail, of the individuals of a species, even when the mixture is not
identical. There is no doubt that there is wisdom here working with a
purpose. This is soul. There is another argument based upon the visible
results of other mixtures which exhibit properties that cannot be
remotely compared with the functions we attribute to the soul. The
animal and the plant exhibit activities far beyond anything present in
the simple elements of the mixture. There must therefore be in animals
and plants something additional to the elements of the mixture. This
extra thing resides in the composite of which it forms a part, for
without it the animal or plant is no longer what it is. Hence as the
latter is substance, that which forms a part of it is also substance;
for accident, as Aristotle says, is that which resides _in_ a thing but
not as forming a part of it.
We have now shown that the soul is substance and not accident. We must
still make clear in which of the four senses of the Aristotelian
substance the soul is to be regarded. By the theory of exclusion Ibn
Daud decides that the soul is substance in the sense in which we apply
that term to "form." The form appears upon the common matter and
"specifies" it, and makes it what it is, bringing it from potentiality
to actuality. It is also the efficient and final cause of the body. The
body exists for the sake of the soul, in order that the soul may attain
its perfection through the body. As the most perfect body in the lower
world is the human body, and it is for the sake of the soul, it follows
that the existence of the sublunar world is for the sake of the human
soul, that it may be purified and made perfect by science and moral
conduct.
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