A History of Mediaeval Jewish PhilosophyHusik, Isaac
ReligionJewish
A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy
Husik, Isaac
Philosophy, Jewish; Philosophy, Medieval
We have thus shown that God is one both in the sense of simple and in
the sense of unique. To have a clear insight into the nature of his
unity, we must now show that nothing else outside of God is really one,
though we apply the term one to many things. No one will claim that a
collective is one; but neither is an individual really one, for an
individual man, for example, consists of many organs. You might think
that a homogeneous and continuous elementary mass like air or water is
one. But this is not true either, for everything that is corporeal is
composed of matter and form. If then we set aside corporeal objects and
aim to find real unity in mathematical entities like line and surface,
which are not corporeal, we are met with the difficulty that line and
surface are divisible, and hence potentially multiple. But neither are
the simple intellectual substances, like the angels, true ones; for they
are composed of their own possible existence and the necessary
existence they acquire from another. The only being therefore that may
be a true one is that which is not corporeal and not dependent upon
another for its existence.
Considering the question of unity from a different aspect, in its
relation, namely, to the thing designated as one, we find that unity
never forms the essence of anything called by that name; but is in every
case an accident. Thus if it were the essence of man as man that he is
one, there could not on the one hand be many men, and on the other there
could not also at the same time be one horse, one tree, one stone. In
God his unity cannot be an accident, since as simple he has no
accidents. Hence his unity is his essence. And if we examine the matter
carefully we find that it is a negative concept. It involves two things.
First, that every other unity involves plurality in some form or
another. And second that being unlike anything else, he cannot bear
having other things associated with him to make the result many, as we
can in the case of man. A, for example, is one; and with B, C, and D he
becomes many. This is not applicable to God.[238]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account