Perhaps the mysterious profession of the Foreign Secretary in regard to the future interests of all the British Protectorates in Borneo, which has been noticed, conceals the real motives, yet to be revealed, for this sudden departure, which red tapeism can hardly explain away, and which has given rise to a political position that is peculiar, whether viewed in the light of expediency or as a matter of sheer justice. The professed motives appear to be scarcely logical, for this fresh policy involved no obvious advantages to the Empire, was displeasing to the natives, and unfair to the interests of Sarawak. But, unfortunately, evidence is not wanting that there are other motives, which are not only illogical but unwarrantable, and it is only by keeping these in view that the policy of the British Government becomes intelligible. It is a policy that has not originated at the Foreign or the Colonial Office, but has been adopted by both "on advice given with entire knowledge of place and people"—how, when, and by whom acquired, it would be interesting to learn. Whether Bruni was governed from Singapore or absorbed by Sarawak was a question of little importance to the public, and should have been one of minor importance to the Foreign Office, for either way its position as a British Protectorate would remain unaffected. No one can assert that it is possible to find a man with greater qualifications as a ruler of natives or with a greater knowledge of Bruni and its people than the Rajah of Sarawak, or one whose counsel would have greater weight with chiefs and people, to whom the task of reforming and regenerating that country might with wisdom have been entrusted. Then comes the question of means, so necessary to the establishment of an effective government. To set up such a government in Bruni, and to maintain it, requires a considerable outlay, and an ever-recurring yearly subsidy. This the Rajah knew, and this he was willing and able to bear, but those "with entire knowledge of place and people" thought differently, with the result that the overflowing Treasury chest of the Federated Malay States has had to be drawn upon,[325] and within two years yet another burden in the shape of a debt of some £24,000 has been needlessly put upon an already bankrupt State; and still, with a newly-imposed tariff, which is scarcely in harmony with that of the Federated Malay States, or of Sarawak, Bruni is unable to make both ends meet, and has the pleasant prospect before it of having to negotiate a further loan with no security to offer. So much for expediency.