The rest of the army in the winter of 1776–77 was split up into detachments, and scattered along an extended line from the Delaware to New York. The Americans fully expected Howe to cross the Delaware as soon as the ice permitted and attack Philadelphia, but Howe as usual did nothing. He might have destroyed the American army without difficulty; but so far from attempting it, he allowed Washington with an inferior force to cut off two detached posts and do a great deal of damage. Howe’s operations in the campaign of 1777 were little more satisfactory. After making every preparation to cross the Delaware and advance into Pennsylvania he brought back the army to New York, and embarked for the Chesapeake in order to approach Philadelphia from that side. In September he won the battle of Brandywine, and took possession of Philadelphia on the 26th. This occupation of Philadelphia was the sole result of the campaign; and it was, in fact, a political rather than a military enterprise, the object being to overawe the American Congress. It was a fatal mistake, for while Howe was wasting his time in Pennsylvania, Burgoyne was moving down from Canada to open the line of the Hudson from the north, in the hope of co-operation from Howe’s army in the south. No such co-operation was forthcoming. Howe’s army was engaged elsewhere; Clinton, though, as will be seen, he did make on his own responsibility a slight diversion on the Hudson, yet dared not weaken the garrison of New York. The result was that [Sidenote: 16th Oct.] Burgoyne with his whole force of 7000 men was overpowered and compelled to surrender at Saratoga. The Seventeenth being left in garrison at New York, of course took no share in Howe’s operations. The fact was that in November 1776 it received some 200 recruits and 100 fresh horses from England, so that its time must have been fully occupied in the task of knocking these into shape. Nevertheless small detachments of the regiment were employed in two little affairs which must be related here.