A history of the American people, Vol. 2 [of 5] : $b Colonies and nationWilson, Woodrow
History
A history of the American people, Vol. 2 [of 5] : $b Colonies and nation
Wilson, Woodrow
United States -- History
Mr. Franklin had led a very notable life during the thirty eventful
years which had gone by since he made his way, a mere lad, from Boston
to Philadelphia to earn his livelihood as a journeyman printer; and how
shrewd a knowledge he had gained of the practical affairs of the world
anybody could see for himself who would read the homely-wise maxims he
had been putting forth these twenty-two years in his “Poor Richard’s”
Almanacs, begun in 1732. The plan of union he suggested at Albany was,
that the colonies should submit to have their common interests cared
for by a congress of delegates chosen by their several assemblies,
and a “president-general” appointed and paid by the crown; giving to
the congress a considerable power of actual law-making and to the
president-general the right to veto its acts, subject to the approval of
the ministers at home. To all the delegates at Albany except those from
Connecticut the plan seemed suitable and excellent; but the ministers
at home rejected it because they thought it gave too much power to the
proposed congress, and the colonial assemblies rejected it because they
thought it gave too much power to the president-general. Mr. Franklin
said that the fact that neither the assemblies nor the King’s ministers
liked the plan made him suspect that it must be, after all, an excellent
half-way measure, the “true medium” between extremes, effecting a
particularly fair and equal distribution of power.
[Illustration: BENJAMIN FRANKLIN]
Then the war came, and made many things plain. The colonies did not
coöperate. They contributed troops, watched their own frontiers as they
could against the redskins, and freely spent both blood and money in the
great struggle; but when it was all over, and the French dominion swept
from the continent, it was plain that it had not been the power of the
colonies but the power of England and the genius of the great Pitt that
had won in the critical contest. France could send few reinforcements to
Canada because England’s ships commanded the sea. The stout Canadians
had had to stand out for themselves unaided, with such troops as were
already in the colony. In 1759, the year Wolfe took Quebec, there were
more soldiers in the English colonies threatening the St. Lawrence than
there were men capable of bearing arms in all Canada,—and quite half of
them were regulars, not provincials. Pitt saw to it that enough troops
and supplies were sent to America to insure success, and that men capable
of victory and of efficient management even in the forested wilderness
were put in command of affairs in the field. He did not depend upon the
colonies to do what he knew they had no plan or organization for doing,
but set himself to redress the balance of power in Europe by decisive
victories which should make England indisputable mistress of America. “No
man ever entered Mr. Pitt’s closet who did not find himself braver when
he came out than when he went in,” said a soldier who had held conference
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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