A History of the British Army, Vol. 1: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 1: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
The reign of King John accentuated still further the weak points
of the English feudal system as a military organisation. The
principle introduced by the Conqueror had been to claim for the
sovereign direct feudal authority over every landholder in the
country, suffering no intermediate class of virtually independent
vassals, such as existed in France, to intercept the service of
those who owed duty to him. Of the advantages of this innovation
mention shall presently be made elsewhere, but at this point it
is necessary to dwell only on its military defects. The whole
efficiency of the feudal system turned on the creation of a caste
of warriors; and such a caste can obviously be built up only by
the grant of certain exclusive privileges. The English knights
possessed no such privileges. There were no special advantages
bound up with the tenure of a fief. Far from enjoying immunity
from taxation, as in France and Germany, the knights were obliged
to pay not only the imposts required of all classes, but scutage
into the bargain. Again the winning of a knight's fee lay open
to all ranks of freemen, so that it could not be regarded as the
hereditary possession of a proud nobility. Yet again, the grant of
the honour of knighthood was the exclusive right of the sovereign,
who converted it simply into an instrument of extortion. Briefly,
there was no inducement to English knights faithfully to perform
their service; the sovereign took everything and gave nothing;
and at last they would endure such oppression no longer. When
John required a feudal force, in the year 1205, he was obliged to
arrange that every ten knights should equip one of their number
for service. Moreover, the knights who did serve him showed no
merit; the English contingent at Bouvines having covered itself
with anything but glory. Finally, came mutiny and rebellion and the
Great Charter, wherein the express stipulation that fiefs should
be both alienable and divisible crushed all hopes of an hereditary
caste of warriors for ever.
[Sidenote: 1252.]
After the Charter the national force was composed nominally of
three elements, the tenants in chief with their armed vassals, the
minor tenants in chief, and the freemen subject to the Assize of
Arms, the last two being both under the orders of the sheriffs.
It made an imposing show on paper, but was difficult to bring
efficient into the field. No man was more shameless than Henry
the Third in forcing knighthood, for the sake of the fees, upon
all free landholders whom he thought rich enough to support the
dignity; yet, when the question became one not of money but of
armed men, he was forced to fall back on the same resource as his
greater namesake. He simply issued a writ for the enforcement of
the Assize of Arms, and ordered the sheriffs to furnish a fixed
contingent of men-at-arms, to be provided by the men of the county
who were subject thereto.
[Sidenote: 1282.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account