A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of the fifteen
thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore
themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand
were killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English
battalions just exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers
were the Twelfth and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost
over three hundred men, the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which
lost rather less than three hundred men apiece, and the three
battalions of Guards, which lost each of them about two hundred
and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot, Cumberland, Ligonier, and
Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of the fire, alone came
off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed or wounded. Many
regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in particular the
Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the British cavalry
exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The loss of the
French was never made public, but was certainly at least equal to
that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no
great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. As an example of
the prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a
parallel in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire
of artillery, remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly
for half a mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched
up to within pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their
volley before they discharged a shot. They shattered the French
battalions to pieces, repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry,
halted under a heavy cannonade, retired for some distance and
reformed under a cross-fire, advanced again with both artillery
and musketry playing on front and flanks, made the bravest brigade
in the French service recoil, repelled another desperate attack
of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly under a cross-fire
almost to the end. By consent of all the British commanders it
was Ingoldsby's misunderstanding of his orders and his failure to
capture the Redoubt d'Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby was
duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however,
acquitted of all but an error in judgment; and indeed there was
no question of cowardice, for he accompanied the remainder of the
infantry in its advance with his own detachment and was severely
wounded. It is customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head
against a wall in attempting such an attack, but he could hardly
have been expected to count on such bad luck as the failure of
Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on the other. The sheer
audacity of his advance went near to give him the victory. Saxe
owned that he never dreamed that any General would attempt such a
stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland is blamed
also for not attacking either the Redoubt d'Eu or Fontenoy after
he had penetrated into the French camp. This charge is less easy
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