A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' WarFortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
A History of the British Army, Vol. 2: First Part—to the Close of the Seven Years' War
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Great Britain -- History, Military; Great Britain. Army -- History
the whole of the forces present, alike of England, Hanover, and
Austria, should be concentrated for an immediate attack on Dunkirk,
where the best of the French troops were known to be gathered
together. These troops once beaten, the road would be clear for a
march to Paris.[160]
But just at this moment King George suddenly turned lukewarm. He
was not at war with France, he said, and his troops were acting
simply as auxiliaries to the Queen of Hungary. France could take
no offence at their presence, as her troops were likewise employed
only as auxiliaries to the Elector of Bavaria.[161] Again, there
were sundry arrangements to be adjusted before the troops of the
Allies could be concentrated. It was, therefore, not until the 24th
of August that orders were despatched to the Hanoverians to march;
and even then King George was inclined rather to bar the return
march of Maillebois from Bohemia at the Meuse than to strike at
the heart of his enemy at Dunkirk. Then, again, the men of skill
in England, as Stair contemptuously called the council of war at
Whitehall, thought the attack on Dunkirk too venturesome; and the
plan was disapproved, chiefly, it should seem, because the King
had some idea of taking command of the Army in person.[162] Stair
meanwhile was chafing with impatience, concerting new plans with
the Austrian commanders, and promising himself that his winter
quarters should be in Normandy. His design now was to march
straight for the head of the Oise, which would give him a navigable
river for his transport, and to move from thence direct upon Paris.
The French troops on the spot were few in number and would not dare
to leave Dunkirk. The road for two-thirds of the journey to the
Oise was paved, and the short distance that remained, therefore,
constituted the only difficulty, by no means insuperable, in the
way. Arrived at Paris the army could take artillery from the
arsenal there, and move down the Seine to the siege of Havre.
Finally, Stair promised that, if the King would give him a free
hand, he would enable him before the 12th of October to dictate his
own terms.[163]
The plan was daring enough, but Stair was neither a visionary nor
an idle boaster, and there appears no reason to doubt that it was
perfectly feasible. The French had recently fortified Dunkirk
anew, and, as was not uncommon with them, had elaborated the works
to such excess that forty thousand men were required to defend
them. Unless, therefore, they chose to abandon Dunkirk, which they
could hardly afford to do, there remained no troops to check an
advance on Paris. But the design did not commend itself to the
King. He submitted it to General Wade, slowest and most cautious
of generals, who criticised it adversely; and meanwhile, whether
through jealousy or treachery or sheer mismanagement, the orders
for the Hanoverians to march were on one pretext or another delayed
until all hopes of a campaign of 1742 were banished by the coming
of the winter.[164]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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