strong, though he had lost part of the 15,000 troops that first attacked, some of whom, indeed, were streaming away from the field panic-stricken, down the Careenage Ravine into Sevastopol, and over the Tchernaya bridge. But he had his powerful and numerous artillery securely posted on West Jut, Shell Hill, and East Jut, and, besides the greater portion of the 15,000 men, there were 20,000 fresh troops. Of these latter, 10,000 were in reserve, and the other 10,000 in the Quarry Ravine, in the neighbouring glens, on the post-road, and in the Sandbag battery which they had just captured.[274] ----- Footnote 274: According to the theory of Mr. Kinglake (whose excellent work on the Crimean War has been largely drawn upon, in preparing this part of the present volume), the 15,000 men who attacked in the early morning in two columns, one 9000 strong on our left and the other 6000 on our right, were so completely shattered by their first encounter with the detachments of the Second Division, that they _all_ fled away, and not a man of them took any further part in the battle. Also that, of the 20,000 infantry remaining to the Russians, practically only 10,000 were engaged, the reserve of 10,000 being most of it kept back. Thus, while 15,000 were dispersed into space with the utmost ease, in an hour, by very few opponents, almost as if by magic, the 10,000 made so good a resistance that they were with difficulty vanquished, in three hours and a half, by the 4700 Englishmen who were on the scene at this moment, aided by 1600 French, who appeared soon after, and by the Algerines, Zouaves, and other troops of the same nation, 4000 strong, who reached the ground between ten and eleven o’clock. Nor is it alleged that the early attacks of the enemy were delivered by worse troops than those who came into action at 7.30 a.m. This theory was evidently not believed by some who fought at Inkerman, and Colonel Tower is of opinion that when the Guards first entered into the struggle, they met the Tarutin and Borodino regiments; that is, the eight Russian battalions which formed the main portion of the first attack made by the enemy with 6000 men on the Kitspur, and which, by Kinglake’s account, were not only repulsed, but clean driven from the field never to appear there again, by the bold onset of 700 to 800 Englishmen.