The indirect torture of especially harsh imprisonment was not unknown to the Inquisition, and was occasionally employed for the purpose of breaking down obstinacy. It was not, as in the medieval Inquisition, prescribed as an ordinary resource, but it was at the discretion of the tribunal and could at any time be brought into play, as in the case of a pertinacious heretic, in 1512, who was consigned to the most noisome part of the prison, and afflicted in various ways, in the hope of enlightening his understanding.[9] In the later period of leisurely action, protracted imprisonment was frequently resorted to, in the hope of inducing repentance and conversion, when wearing anxiety and despair weakened the will as effectually as the sharper agonies of the pulley and rack. There was also the ingenious device, frequently effective, by which the fiscal concluded his formal accusation with a demand that, if necessary, the accused should be tortured until he confessed. This was unknown in the earlier period, but the Instructions of 1561 recommend it, giving as a reason its good results, and also that torture requires a demand from the prosecutor and a notification to the defendant, who is unprepared for it at this stage of the trial.[10] After this it became the universal custom in all cases admitting of torture, and the profound impression produced on the unfortunate prisoner can be readily conceived. [Sidenote: _PRELIMINARIES_] Torture itself, however, was regarded as too serious to be left to the arbitrary temper of a baffled or angry inquisitor, and was preceded by formalities designed to prevent its abuse. It was the last resort when the result of a trial left doubts to be satisfied. After the prosecution and defence had closed, and the consulta de fe had assembled to consider the sentence, if the evidence was too weak for condemnation while the innocence of the accused was not clear, it could adopt a vote to torture and postpone the decision to await the outcome. Even in the ferocity of the early period this deliberateness was frequently observed, although in the reckless haste of procedure it was often omitted. Thus, in the case of Diego García, a priest accused of having said twenty years before, when a boy, that the sacrament was bread, the consulta held two meetings, January 18 and 19, 1490, and finally voted torture. There was no haste however and it was not until February 11th that García was exposed to the very moderate water-torture of about a quart of water. No confession was obtained and he was untied, with the protest that he had not been sufficiently tortured, but it was not repeated and, on February 26th, he was acquitted and restored to his fame and honor, though, with the curiously perverse inquisitorial logic, he was made to abjure _de vehementi_ and forbidden to celebrate mass for six months.[11] The vote of the consulta however was not universal and, in 1518, the Suprema