A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
No proofs of inferiority could open their eyes, and they rushed
from one error and misfortune to another, benefiting by no experience,
and disdaining to seek aid and improvement’ [pp. 194-5].
A voice from the ranks, Sergeant Surtees of the Rifle Brigade, gives
the same idea in different words.
‘Most of the Spanish officers appeared to be utterly unfit and
unable to command their men. They had all the pride, arrogance, and
self-sufficiency of the best officers in the world, with the very least
of all pretension to have a high opinion of themselves. It is true they
were not all alike, but the majority were the most haughty, and at the
same time the most contemptible creatures in the shape of officers that
ever I beheld’ [p. 109].
As a matter of fact the class of officers in Spain was filled up
in three different ways. One-third of them were, by custom, drawn
from the ranks. In an army raised by conscription from all strata
of society excellent officers can be procured in this way. But in
one mainly consisting of the least admirable part of the surplus
population, forced by want or hatred of work into enlisting, it was
hard to get even good sergeants. And the sergeants made still worse
sub-lieutenants, when the colonel was forced to promote some of them.
No wonder that the English observer thought that there were ‘Spanish
officers who did not look like gentlemen.’ This class were seldom
or never allowed to rise above the grade of captain. The remaining
two-thirds of the officers received their commissions from the war
office: in the cavalry they were supposed to show proofs of noble
descent, but this was not required in the infantry. There was a
large sprinkling, however, of men of family, and for them the best
places and the higher ranks were generally reserved--a thing feasible
because all promotion was arbitrary, neither seniority nor merit
being necessarily considered. The rest were drawn from all classes of
society: for the last fifteen years any toady of Godoy could beg or
buy as many commissions for his protégés as he pleased. But a large,
and not the worst, part of the body of officers was composed of the
descendants of soldiers of fortune--Irishmen were most numerous, but
there were also French and Italians--who had always been seen in great
numbers in the Spanish army. They held most of the upper-middle grades
in the regiments, for the promoted sergeants were kept down to the
rank of captain, while the nobles got rapid promotion and soon rose
to be colonels and generals. On the whole we cannot doubt that there
was a mass of bad officers in the Spanish army: the ignorant fellows
who had risen from the ranks, the too-rapidly promoted scions of the
noblesse, and the nominees of Godoy’s hangers-on, were none of them
very promising material with which to conduct a war _à outrance_ for
the existence of the realm.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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