A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
In 1808 there was but one small military college for the training of
infantry and cavalry officers. Five existed in 1790, but Godoy cut them
down to one at Zamora, and only allowed sixty cadets there at a time,
so that five-sixths of the young men who got commissions went straight
to their battalions, there to pick up (if they chose) the rudiments of
their military education. From want of some common teaching the drill
and organization of the regiments were in a condition of chaos. Every
colonel did what he chose in the way of manual exercise and manœuvres.
A French officer says that in 1807 he saw a Spanish brigade at a
review, in which, when the brigadier gave the order ‘Ready, present,
fire!’ the different battalions carried it out in three different
times and with wholly distinct details of execution.
Not only was the Spanish army indifferently officered, but even of
such officers as it possessed there were not enough. In the old line
regiments there should have been seventy to each corps, i.e. 2,450 to
the 105 battalions of that arm. But Godoy had allowed the numbers to
sink to 1,520. When the insurrection broke out, the vacant places had
to be filled, and many regiments received at the same moment twenty
or thirty subalterns taken from civil life and completely destitute
of military training. Similarly the militia ought to have had 1,800
officers, and only possessed 1,200 when the war began. The vacancies
were filled, but with raw and often indifferent material.
Such were the officers with whom the British army had to co-operate.
There is no disguising the fact that from the first the allies could
not get on together. In the earlier years of the war there were some
incidents that happened while the troops of the two nations lay
together, which our countrymen could never forgive or forget. We
need only mention the midnight panic in Cuesta’s army on the eve of
Talavera, when 10,000 men ran away without having had a shot fired at
them, and the cowardly behaviour of La Peña in 1811, when he refused to
aid Graham at the bloody little battle of Barossa.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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