A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna — John Shaqi
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of CorunnaOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809 : $b From the treaty of Fontainbleau to the battle of Corunna
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
As a matter of fact Bonaparte’s mind had long been made up. The
revolution of Aranjuez had been a surprise and a disappointment to
him: his designs against Spain were made infinitely more difficult
of realization thereby. While he had only the weak and unpopular
government of Godoy and Charles IV to deal with, he had fancied that
the game was in his hands. It had been more than probable that the
Prince of the Peace would take fright, and carry off the King and
Queen to America--in which case he would, as it were, find Spain left
derelict. If, however, the emigration did not take place, and it
became necessary to lay hands on Charles and his favourite, Napoleon
calculated that the Spaniards would be more pleased to be rid of Godoy
than angry to see force employed against him. He was so profoundly
ignorant of the character of the nation, that he imagined that a few
high-sounding proclamations and promises of liberal reforms would
induce them to accept from his hands any new sovereign whom he chose to
nominate. It was clear that the accession of a young and popular king
would make matters far more difficult. It was no longer possible to
pose as the deliverer of Spain from the shameful predominance of Godoy.
Any move against Ferdinand must bear the character of an open assault
on the national independence of the kingdom.
But Bonaparte had gone too far to recede: he had not moved 100,000
men across the Pyrenees, and seized Pampeluna and Barcelona, merely
in order that his troops might assist at the coronation ceremonies of
another Bourbon king. In spite of all difficulties he was resolved
to persevere in his iniquitous plan. He would not recognize the new
monarch, but would sweep him away, and put in his place some member
of his own family. But his chosen instrument was not to be Murat, but
one of the Bonapartes. He knew too well the Duke of Berg’s restless
spirit and overweening ambition to trust him with so great a charge
as Spain. And he was right--with only Naples at his back Joachim was
powerful enough to do his master grave harm in 1814. The tool was to
be one of his own brothers. It was on the night of March 26 that the
news of the abdication of Charles IV reached him: on the morning of
the twenty-seventh he wrote to Amsterdam offering Louis Bonaparte the
chance of exchanging the Dutch for the Spanish crown. The proposal was
made in the most casual form--‘You say that the climate of Holland does
not suit you. Besides the country is too thoroughly ruined to rise
again. Give me a categorical answer: if I nominate you King of Spain
will you take the offer; can I count on you?[45]’ Louis very wisely
refused the proffered crown: but his weaker brother Joseph, tired of
Naples and its brigands, made no scruples when the same proposal was
laid before him.
[45] _Nap. Corresp._, xvi. 500; see also in _Documents
historiques, publiés par Louis Bonaparte_ (Paris, 1829), ii. 290.
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