A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Meanwhile Heudelet’s communication with Oporto had been interrupted,
for the Portuguese, routed on the Lima a week before, had come back
to their old haunts, seized Braga, and blocked the high-road and
the bridges. Soult only got into touch with his expeditionary force
by sending out Lahoussaye with 3,000 men to reopen the road to the
North. When this was done, he bade Heudelet evacuate Valenza (whose
fortifications turned out to be in too bad order to be repaired
in any reasonable space of time), and to disperse his division in
garrisons for Braga, Viana, and Barcelos. The whole of the convoy and
the sick from Tuy were sent up to Oporto.
The net result of Heudelet’s operations was that the Marshal,
at the cost of immobilizing one of his four infantry divisions,
obtained a somewhat precarious hold upon the flat country of
Entre-Douro-e-Minho. The towns were in his hands, but the _Ordenanza_
had only retired to the hills, and perpetually descended to worry
Heudelet’s detachments, and to murder couriers and foraging parties.
Meanwhile 4,000 men were wasted for all purposes of offensive action.
Vigo, Tuy, and Valenza had all been abandoned, and touch with the
army of Galicia had been completely lost.
Even this modest amount of success had been denied to Soult’s
second expedition, that which he had sent under Loison towards the
Tras-os-Montes. The enemy with whom the French had to deal in this
region was Silveira, the same officer who had been defeated between
Monterey and Chaves in the early days of March, when the 2nd Corps
crossed the Portuguese frontier. He had fled with the wrecks of
his force towards Villa Real, at the moment when Soult marched on
Braga, and the Marshal had fondly hoped that he was now a negligible
quantity in the campaign. This was far from being the case: the
moment that Silveira heard that the French had crossed the mountains
and marched on Braga, he had rallied his two regular regiments and
his masses of _Ordenanza_, and pounced down on the detachment under
Commandant Messager, which Soult had left in garrison at Chaves.
This, it will be remembered, consisted of no more than a company
of infantry, a quantity of convalescents and stragglers, and the
untrustworthy Spanish-Portuguese ‘legion,’ which had been formed
out of the prisoners captured on March 6 and 12[316]. On the very
day upon which Soult was routing Eben in front of Braga, Silveira
appeared before the walls of Chaves with 6,000 men. Messager retired
into the citadel, abandoning on the outer walls of the town a few
guns, which the Portuguese were thus enabled to turn against the
inner defences. After a siege of five days and much ineffective
cannonading, the governor surrendered, mainly because the native
‘legion’ was preparing to open the gates to Silveira. Twelve hundred
men were captured, of whom only one-third were Frenchmen capable of
bearing arms, the rest being sick or ‘legionaries.’
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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