A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
[316] Le Noble, though he mentions the formation of the legion
(p. 120), omits to state that it was left at Chaves. But St.
Chamans establishes this fact (p. 120); he calls the corps
‘les Espagnols et Portugais qui se disaient de notre parti.’
Des Odoards (p. 212) also speaks of the ‘legion,’ as does
Naylies (p. 81). Its existence explains both the feebleness
of Messager’s defence, and the large number of prisoners whom
Silveira captured. The fighting force of the garrison was only
the one company, plus some hundreds of convalescents, who in the
fortnight since Soult’s departure had been able to resume their
arms.
Having made this successful stroke, Silveira marched down the Tamega
to Amarante, making a movement parallel to Soult’s advance on Oporto.
His recapture of Chaves brought several thousands more of _Ordenanza_
to his standard, and at Amarante he was joined on the thirtieth by
many of the fugitives who had escaped from the sack of Oporto on the
previous day. He spread his army, now amounting to 9,000 or 10,000
men, along the left bank of the Tamega, whose bridges and fords he
protected with entrenchments. Advanced guards were pushed out on the
further side of the river on the three roads which lead to Oporto.
When, therefore, the troops under Loison, which Soult had sent out
towards the Tras-os-Montes, drew near the Tamega, they found the
Portuguese in force. The cavalry could get no further forward than
Penafiel; when Foy’s infantry came up (April 7) Loison tried to
force the enemy back, both on the Amarante and on the Canavezes
road. He failed at each point, and sent back to the Marshal to ask
for reinforcements. Seeing him halt, Silveira, whose fault was not a
want of initiative, actually crossed the river with his whole army,
and fell upon the two French brigades. He was checked, but not badly
beaten, and Loison remained on the defensive (April 12).
At this moment Soult heard of the fall of Chaves, full seventeen
days after it had happened. Realizing that Silveira was now growing
formidable, he sent to Loison’s aid General Delaborde with the second
of his infantry brigades, and Lorges’ dragoons. These reinforcements
brought the troops facing Silveira up to a total of some 6,500
men--nearly a third of Soult’s whole disposable force. As Heudelet
was still absent on the Minho with 4,000 men more, the Marshal had
less than 10,000 left in and about Oporto. It was clear that the
grand march on Lisbon was not likely to begin for many a long day.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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