[339] In common fairness to Moore, it is necessary to quote Wellesley’s own words on their fundamental difference of opinion as to the possibility of defending Portugal. ‘I have as much respect as any man can have for the opinion and judgement of Sir J. Moore, and I should mistrust my own (if opposed to his) in a case where he had an opportunity of knowing and considering. But he positively knew nothing of Portugal, and _could_ know nothing of its existing state.’ Yet he says that ‘The greatest disadvantage under which I labour is that Sir John Moore gave an opinion that the country could not be defended by the army under his command.’ Wellington to Lord Liverpool, from Vizeu, April 2, 1810. ‘I can say generally that the frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior force. It is an open frontier, all equally rugged, but all equally to be penetrated. If the French succeed in Spain it will be vain to attempt to resist them in Portugal. The Portuguese are without a military force ... no dependence can be placed on any aid that they can give. The British must in that event, I conceive, immediately take steps to evacuate the country. Lisbon is the only port, and therefore the only place from whence the army, with its stores, can embark.... We might check the progress of the enemy while the stores are embarking, and arrangements are being made for taking off the army. Beyond this the defence of Lisbon or of Portugal should not be thought of.’ Four months later, on March 7, 1809, Sir Arthur Wellesley answered the same question, put to him by the same minister, in very different terms. ‘I have always been of opinion that Portugal might be defended, whatever might be the result of the contest in Spain, and that in the meantime measures adopted for the defence of Portugal would be highly useful to the Spaniards in their contest with the French. My notion was that the Portuguese military establishment ought to be revived, and that in addition to those troops His Majesty ought to employ about 20,000 British troops, including about 4,000 cavalry. My opinion was that, even if Spain should have been conquered, the French would not be able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than 100,000 men. As long as the contest may continue in Spain, this force [the 20,000 British troops], if it could be placed in a state of activity, would be highly useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually decide the contest.’