A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Between these two divergent views as to the practicability of
defending Portugal, Lord Castlereagh had to make his decision. On
it--though he could not be aware of the fact--depended the future
of Britain and of Bonaparte. He carefully considered the situation;
after the disasters of the Corunna retreat it required some moral
courage for a minister to advise the sending of another British
army to the Peninsula. Moore’s gloomy prognostications were echoed
by many military experts, and there were leading men--soldiers and
politicians--who declared that the only thing that now remained to
be done was to withdraw Cradock’s 10,000 sabres and bayonets from
Lisbon, before the French came near enough to that city to make their
embarkation difficult.
Castlereagh resolved to stake his faith on the correctness of
Wellesley’s conclusions: all through these years of contest he had
made him his most trusted adviser on things military, and now he did
not swerve from his confidence. He announced to him, privately in the
end of March, and officially on April 2[340], that the experiment of
a second expedition to Portugal should be tried, and that he himself
should have the conduct of it. Reinforcements should at once be sent
out to bring the British army at Lisbon up to a total of 30,000
men--the number to which Wellesley, on consideration, raised the
original 20,000 of which he had spoken. Beresford had already sailed,
with orders to do all that he could for the reorganization of the
disorderly native forces of Portugal. The few regiments in England
that were ready for instant embarkation were sent off ere March
ended, and began to arrive at Lisbon early in April[341]. Others were
rapidly prepared for foreign service; but it was a misfortune that
the Corunna battalions were still too sickly and depleted to be able
to sail, so that troops who had seen nothing of the first campaign
had to be sent out. The majority of them were ‘second battalions’
from the home establishment[342], many of them very weak in numbers
and full of young soldiers, as they had been drained in the previous
year to fill their first battalions up to full strength. Finally,
just behind the first convoys of reinforcements, Wellesley himself
set sail from Portsmouth, after resigning his position as Under
Secretary for Ireland, which, by a curious anomaly, he had continued
to hold all through the campaign of Vimiero, and the proceedings of
inquiry concerning the Convention of Cintra. He sailed upon April
14, in the _Surveillante_ frigate, had the narrowest of escapes
from shipwreck on the Isle of Wight during the first night of his
voyage, but soon obtained favourable winds and reached Lisbon on the
twenty-second, after a rapid passage of less than eight days. Just
before he started there had been received from Portugal not only
the correct intelligence that Soult had stormed Oporto upon March
29, but a false rumour that Victor had been joined by the corps of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign — John Shaqi
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account