A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
He was not allowed much time to ponder over the situation. The reply
of Vives only reached him on the night of December 20-21. On the next
morning St. Cyr came out of Barcelona and attacked the lines. He
had brought with him every available man: Duhesme had been left to
hold the city with Lecchi’s Italians alone: his other division (that
of Chabran), together with the three which had formed the army of
succour--those of Souham, Pino, and Chabot--were all directed against
the lines. The plan of St. Cyr was to demonstrate against the bridge
of Molins de Rey, the strongest part of the Spanish position, with
Chabran’s 4,000 men, while he himself crossed the fords lower down
the Llobregat with the 14,000 bayonets of the other three divisions,
and turned the right flank of the enemy.
At five o’clock on a miserable gusty December morning the French
came down towards the river: Chabran led off by making a noisy
demonstration opposite the redoubts at the bridge, on the northern
flank of the position. This, as St. Cyr had intended, drew Reding’s
attention to that flank: he reinforced his left with troops drawn
from his right wing on the lower and easier ground down stream. An
hour later the other attacking columns advanced, that of Souham
crossing the ford of San Juan Despi, while Pino and Chabot passed
by that of San Feliu. No proper attempt was made to dispute their
advance. Outnumbered, and strung out along a very extensive position,
the Catalans soon saw their line broken in several places. The only
serious opposition made was by the centre, which advanced down hill
against Souham and tried to charge him, but gave back long before
bayonets had been crossed.
The most fatal part of Reding’s position was that on his extreme
right Chabot’s three battalions had got completely round his flank,
and kept edging in on the rear of his southern wing, which abandoned
hill after hill as it saw its retreat threatened. Pino and Souham
had only to press on, and each regiment in their front gave way in
turn when it saw its exposed flank in danger. At last the whole of
the Spanish right and centre was pushed back in disorder on to the
still intact left behind the bridge of Molins de Rey. Now was the
time for Chabran to turn his demonstration into a real attack: if
he had crossed the river and advanced rapidly, he would have caught
the shaken masses in front, while the rest of the army chased them
forward into his arms. But being timid or unenterprising, he let the
flying enemy pass across his front unmolested, and only forded the
river when they had gone too far to be caught. The unhappy Vives came
up at this moment, just in time to see his whole army on the run, and
headed their flight to the hills.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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