A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaignOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 2, Jan.-Sep. 1809 : $b From the battle of Corunna to the end of the Talavera campaign
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
It would seem that, encouraged by St. Cyr’s quiescence, his own
growing strength, and the protestations of the Catalans, Reding had
once more resolved to resume the offensive. The extension of his left
to Igualada was made with no less ambitious a purpose than that of
outflanking the northern wing of the French army, and then delivering
a simultaneous concentric attack on its scattered divisions as they
lay in their cantonments. Such a plan presupposed that St. Cyr would
keep quiet while the preparations were being made, that he would
fail to concentrate in time, and that the Spanish columns, operating
from two distant bases, would succeed in timing their co-operation
with perfect accuracy. At the best they could only have brought some
30,000 men against the 23,000 of St. Cyr’s field army--a superiority
far from sufficient to give them a rational chance of success. It is
probable that at this moment Reding’s best chance of doing something
great for the cause of Spain would have been to leave a strong
garrison in Tarragona, and march early in February with 20,000 men to
the relief of Saragossa, which was now drawing near the end of its
powers of resistance. Lannes and Junot would have had to raise the
siege if an army of such size had come up against them. But, though
intending to succour Saragossa in a few weeks, Reding was induced
by the constant entreaties of the Catalans to undertake first an
expedition against St. Cyr. He sent off no troops to aid the Marquis
of Lazan in his fruitless attempt to relax the pressure on his
brother’s heroic garrison, but devoted all his attention to the 7th
Corps.
St. Cyr was not an officer who was likely to be caught unprepared by
such a movement as Reding had planned. The extension of the Spanish
line to Igualada and the upper Llobregat had not escaped his notice,
and he was fully aware of the advantage which his central position
gave him over an enemy who had been obliging enough to draw out his
fighting strength on an arc of a circle sixty miles from end to end.
Without fully realizing Reding’s intentions, he could yet see that
the Spaniards were giving him a grand opportunity of beating them
in detail. He resolved to strike a blow at their northern wing,
convinced that if he acted with sufficient swiftness and energy he
could crush it long ere it could be succoured from Tarragona.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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