upon’--on every ground, therefore, he ought to avoid ‘risking the King’s army again in such company[6].’ [4] See _Dispatches_, v. 168, for an account of an interview with the Marquis of Malaspina and Lord Macduff, who had come to Badajoz to make personal representation, which Wellington much resented. [5] Wellington to Wellesley, Oct. 30: _Dispatches_, v. 213. For stronger language about the rash folly of Spanish generals, see Wellington to Beresford, ibid. 179. [6] Wellington to Wellesley, Aug. 24, from Merida. There was no getting over this fundamental objection of Wellington’s, and his brother, therefore, was placed in a very uncomfortable position. During all his negotiations with the Central Junta, Lord Wellesley’s task indeed was a most invidious one. He had been directed by his government to profess an earnest desire to aid the Spaniards in bringing the war to a successful conclusion, and to pledge the aid of Great Britain, yet he was forced to refuse every definite proposal made to him by the Junta. On the other hand, there were clauses in his instructions which provoked the most openly-displayed suspicion and resentment, when he touched upon them in his conversations with Martin de Garay and the other Spanish ministers. Such were the proposal to place the whole Spanish army under a British commander (i.e. Wellington), the attempt to open up the subject of a certain measure of free trade with Spanish America, and--most of all--the offer to send British troops to garrison Cadiz. For despite the fiasco of the preceding winter, the Portland ministry were still harping on this old string, and allusions to it occur in nearly every dispatch sent from London to the ambassador at Seville[7]. [7] See Canning’s instruction to Wellesley of June 27, 1809, on pages 186-91 of Wellesley’s _Dispatches and Correspondence_, Lond. 1838.