A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres VedrasOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 3, Sep. 1809-Dec. 1810 : $b Ocaña, Cadiz, Bussaco, Torres Vedras
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The campaign of Bussaco and Torres Vedras, therefore, marked the
turning-point of the whole war, and I have endeavoured to set forth
its meaning in full detail, devoting special care to the explanation
of Wellington’s triple device for arresting the French advance--his
combination of the system of devastation, of the raising of the
_levée en masse_ in Portugal, and of the construction of great
defensive lines in front of Lisbon. Each of these three measures
would have been incomplete without the other two. For the Lines of
Torres Vedras might not have saved Portugal and Europe from the
domination of Napoleon, if the invading army had not been surrounded
on all sides by the light screen of irregular troops, which cut
its communications, and prevented it from foraging far afield. Nor
would Masséna have been turned back, if the land through which he
had advanced had been left unravaged, and if every large village had
contained enough food to subsist a brigade for a day or a battalion
for a week.
The preparations, the advance, and the retreat of Masséna cover about
half of this volume. The rest of it is occupied with the operations
of the French in Northern, Eastern, and Southern Spain--operations
which seemed decisive at the moment, but which turned out to be
mere side-issues in the great contest. For Soult’s conquest of
Andalusia, and Suchet’s victories in Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia
only distracted the imperial generals from their central task--the
expulsion of Wellington and his army from the Peninsula. Most
readers will, I think, find a good deal of new information in the
accounts of the siege of Gerona and the battle of Ocaña. The credit
due to Alvarez for the defence of the Catalonian city has never
been properly set forth before in any English history, nor have the
details of Areizaga’s miserable campaign in La Mancha been fully
studied. In particular, the composition and strength of his army have
never before been elucidated, and Appendices V, VI of this volume
consist of absolutely unpublished documents.
I have to offer my grateful thanks to those who have been good
enough to assist me in the writing of this book, by furnishing me
with stores of private papers, or hitherto unknown official reports.
Two of the kind helpers who put me on the track of new information
for the compiling of Volume II have passed away while Volume III
was in progress. I bitterly regret the loss of my friends General
Arteche and Colonel F. A. Whinyates. The former, with his unrivalled
knowledge of the contents of the historical department of the Madrid
War Office, had enabled me to discover many a lost document of
importance. The latter had placed at my disposal his copious store
of papers, letters, and diaries relating to his old corps, the Royal
Artillery. In this present section of the history of the war I am
still using much of the material which he lent me.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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