Suchet’s invasion of Valencia, in short, was a much harder and more venturesome enterprise than his master had calculated. It was true that the Spanish forces in front of him seemed in September wholly incapable of holding him back. The Army of Catalonia had been reduced by a series of disasters, culminating in the falls of Tarragona and Figueras, to a mere remnant of 8,000 men, lurking in the high hills of the interior. The Army of Valencia had made a miserable exhibition of itself during the last year: it had brought no effective help to the Catalans, and whenever any of its detachments came into contact with the French, they had invariably suffered discreditable defeats, even when their numbers were far greater than those of the invaders. Of all the armies of Spain this was undoubtedly the one with the worst fighting reputation. It was to small profit that the Captain-General was raising yet newer and rawer battalions than those which already existed, to swell the numbers, but not the efficiency, of his command. In July the nominal total of the Valencian army, including the irregulars of the ‘flying column’ of the Empecinado, had been just 30,000 men. By October there were 36,000 under arms, including the new ‘Reserve Division[2],’ whose six battalions of recruits had only 135 officers to 6,000 men--an allowance of one officer to 45 men, not much more than half of the proportion that is necessary even among good veteran troops. But in truth the only valuable fighting force that was present in the kingdom in September was the infantry of the two weak divisions of the old Albuera army, under Zayas and Lardizabal, whom Blake had brought round from Cadiz with him, when he assumed command of the Eastern provinces. They did not between them muster more than 6,000 bayonets, but were good old troops, who were to distinguish themselves in the oncoming campaign. [2] ‘The Reserve Division’ consisted of a 3rd battalion from some of the old regiments of the Valencian army, viz. 1st of Savoya, Avila, Don Carlos, Volunteers of Castile, Cazadores de Valencia, Orihuela. They were each about 1,000 strong, but averaged only 22 officers per battalion. In addition, it was possible that Valencia might be able to draw a few thousand men to her aid from the depleted army of Murcia, which had suffered so severely at Soult’s hands during the short campaign of the previous August[3]. But such assistance was purely problematical; if Soult should stir again from the side of Andalusia, it would be impossible for General Mahy to bring a single Murcian battalion to the succour of Blake. If, by good fortune, he should not, only a fraction of Mahy’s small army would be free, since the greater part of it would be required to watch the Andalusian frontier, and to protect the great naval arsenal and fortress of Cartagena. [3] See vol. iv. pp. 475-83.