On February 6th he wrote to Berthier[218] that he had ordered Montbrun and Foy, on their return from the Alicante expedition, to remain behind in the valley of the Tagus, and not to come on to Salamanca. His reason for abandoning all idea of a general concentration against Wellington in the kingdom of Leon, was that he was convinced that the next move of the British general would be to make a dash at Badajoz, and that he wished to have a considerable force ready in the direction of Almaraz and Talavera, with which he could succour the Army of the South, when it should be compelled to march, as in 1811, to relieve that fortress. His forecast of Wellington’s probable scheme of operations was perfectly correct, and his idea that the best way to foil it would be to hold a large portion of his army in the valley of the Tagus was correct also. But he was not to be permitted to carry out his own plan: the orders from Paris, which he so much dreaded, once more intervened to prescribe for him a very different policy[219]. [218] Marmont to Berthier, Valladolid, Feb. 6. Not in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, but printed in King Joseph’s Correspondance, viii. p. 301. [219] I must confess that all Napier’s comment on Marmont’s doings (vol. iv. pp. 94-5) seems to me to be vitiated by a wish to vindicate Napoleon at all costs, and to throw all possible blame on his lieutenant. His statements contain what I cannot but call a _suggestio falsi_, when he says that ‘Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment in aid, and on Jan. 25 six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, 45,000 men in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence to Ciudad is only four marches.’ This misses the facts that (1) Marmont had only _four_ divisions (Souham, Clausel, Maucune, and the weak division of Thiébault); (2) that Bonnet had not arrived, nor could for some days; (3) that Dorsenne sent nothing, and on Jan. 27 announced that nothing would be forthcoming; (4) that Montbrun (who was at Alicante on Jan. 16) was still far away on the borders of Murcia. With 22,000 men only in hand Marmont was naturally cautious.