A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, MadridOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Wellington during the critical days from January 20th to February 6th
was naturally anxious. He knew that Marmont would concentrate against
him, but he hoped (as indeed he was justified in doing) that the
concentration would be slow and imperfect, and that the Marshal would
find himself too weak to advance from Salamanca. His anxiety was made
somewhat greater than it need have been, by a false report that Foy
and Montbrun were already returned from the Alicante expedition--he
was told that both had got back to Toledo by the beginning of
January[220]--a most mischievous piece of false news. An equally
groundless rumour informed him that Bonnet had left the Asturias,
many days before his departure actually took place. On January 21 he
wrote to Lord Liverpool that Bonnet had passed Benavente on his way
to Salamanca, and that ‘the whole of what had gone eastward’ [i. e.
Foy and Montbrun] was reported to be coming up from the Tagus to
Valladolid, so that in a few days Marmont might possibly have 50,000
men in hand[221]. To make himself strong against such a concentration
he ordered Hill, on January 22, to bring up three brigades of the 2nd
Division to Castello Branco, with which he might join the main army at
a few days’ notice[222]. At the same time he directed General Abadia to
send a force to occupy the Asturias, which must be empty since Bonnet
had evacuated it. It was not till some days later that he got the
reassuring, and correct, news that Foy and Montbrun, instead of being
already at the front in Castile, were not even expected at Toledo till
January 29th, and that Bonnet had started late, and was only at La
Baneza when February had already begun. But, by the time that he had
received this information, it had already become evident that Marmont
was not about to take the offensive, and Ciudad Rodrigo was already
in a condition to resist a _coup-de-main_; while, since the whole
siege-train of the Army of Portugal had been captured therein, it was
certain that the Marshal could not come up provided with the artillery
required for a regular siege.
[220] See _Dispatches_, viii. p. 547.
[221] I fancy that Wellington’s erroneous statement that Marmont
had six divisions collected at Salamanca on the 23rd-24th
[misprinted by Gurwood, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 577, as ‘the 6th
Division!’] was Napier’s source for stating that such a force
was assembled, which it certainly was not, Wellington reckoned
that Marmont had Souham, Clausel, Maucune, Thiébault, and two
divisions from the East, which last had not really come up--and
never were to do so.
[222] Wellington to Hill, Jan. 22, _Dispatches_, viii. p. 566.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account