In view of these facts Blake resolved to threaten Suchet’s flanks with demonstrations, which he had no intention of turning into attacks, but to endeavour to dislodge him from his forward position by turning loose the guerrilleros of Aragon on to his rear. With the former purpose he sent out two detachments from the Valencian lines, Obispo’s division to Segorbe,--where it cut the French communication with Teruel and southern Aragon,--Charles O’Donnell with Villacampa’s infantry and San Juan’s horse to Benaguacil, a point in the plains fifteen miles west of Saguntum, where his force formed a link between Obispo and the main body of the Valencian army, which still remained entrenched in the lines of the Guadalaviar[17]. These two detachments threatened Suchet’s flank, and even his rear, but there was no intention of turning the threat into a reality. [17] Blake kept under his own hand in the lines the divisions of Zayas, Lardizabal, Miranda, and the Reserve. The real movement on which Blake relied for the discomfiture of the invaders of Valencia was that of the guerrillero bands of Aragon and the neighbouring parts of Castile, to whom he had appealed for help the moment that Suchet commenced his march. He believed that the 6,000 or 7,000 men which Suchet had left scattered in small garrisons under General Musnier might be so beset and worried by the _partidas_, that the Marshal might be compelled to turn back to their aid. Even Mina from his distant haunts in Navarre had been asked to co-operate. This was an excellent move, and might have succeeded, if Musnier alone had remained to hold down Aragon. But Blake had forgotten in his calculations the 15,000 men of Reille and Severoli, cantoned in Navarre and along the Upper Ebro, who were available to strengthen the small force which lay in the garrisons under Musnier’s charge.