The Emperor’s second and third dispatches, those of November 20-21st, turned up on December 13th[49], and Marmont found himself under orders to find 9,000 men for the Cuenca expedition,--since d’Armagnac had only 3,000 men to contribute--and in addition 3,000-4,000 more for the line of communications. Now the Marshal was as fully convinced as his master that Wellington was not in a condition to move, or to do any serious harm, and under this impression, and being probably stirred (as Napoleon afterwards remarked)[50] by the desire to increase his own reputation by a dashing feat of arms, he resolved to take charge of the expedition in person. He ordered that the divisions of Foy and Sarrut--both weak units, the one of eight, the other of nine battalions[51]--and Montbrun’s light cavalry should prepare to march under his own charge to join d’Armagnac, and move on Valencia. Another division should come into La Mancha to take up the cantonments evacuated by Foy, and keep over the line of communications. Clausel should be left in charge of the remainder of the army, and observe Wellington. [49] Date fixed by Marmont’s letter to Berthier of Feb. 6. [50] ‘Sa Majesté (writes Berthier) pense que, dans cette circonstance, vous avez plus calculé votre gloire personnelle que le bien de son service,’ Jan. 23, letter quoted above on the last page. [51] Each division had about 4,000 or 4,500 men: the light cavalry about 1,700, so the whole would have made about 10,000 sabres and bayonets. This scheme was never carried out, for on December 20 Marmont received another dispatch, ordering him to transfer his head-quarters to Valladolid, and to move a large part of his army into Old Castile. Of this more hereafter. But being thus prevented (for his own good fortune as it turned out) from going on the expedition, he gave over Foy’s and Sarrut’s divisions to Montbrun, and bade him execute the diversion. He himself went, as ordered, to Valladolid. If he had received the last dispatch a little later, or had started a little earlier, he would have been put in the ignominious position of being absent from his own point of danger, when Wellington suddenly struck at Ciudad Rodrigo in the early days of January.