wording of his own dispatch, reproached Marmont (when evil results had followed) for having detached ‘an army corps and thirty guns’ for the diversion, instead of ‘a light flying column.[47]’ But it will be seen that the Marshal was literally obeying the orders given him when he moved 12,000 men towards Valencia. For the Army of the Centre provided not much more than 3,000 men under General d’Armagnac for the Cuenca expedition[48], and Marmont had, therefore, to find 9,000 men to bring it up to the strength which the Emperor prescribed, as well as the 3,000-4,000 men to cover the line of communications. [45] _Correspondance de Napoléon_, 18,267, and cf. pp. 590-2 of vol. iv of this work. [46] See these dispatches printed in full in Marmont’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 256-8. This wording is most important and should be studied with care. Note that Wellington’s sick have gone up from 18,000 to 20,000 in twenty-four hours, to oblige the Emperor. [47] Berthier to Marmont, January 23, 1812. Printed in the latter’s _Mémoires_, iv. pp. 297-9. [48] Though King Joseph had said that if Marmont took over the whole of La Mancha, he could then reinforce d’Armagnac up to 8,000 men. This he never really accomplished (Joseph to Berthier, Nov. 26). All these dispatches reached Marmont’s head-quarters at Plasencia with the tardiness that was normal in Spain, where officers bearing orders had to be escorted by detachments many hundreds strong, supposing that their certain arrival at their destination was desired. If they travelled rapidly and unescorted, they became the inevitable prey of the guerrilleros. The dispatch of October 18th, saying that Marmont must replace King Joseph’s garrisons in La Mancha, came to hand on November 11, and the Marshal accordingly directed Foy’s division, then at Toledo, to break itself up and occupy the various posts which the German division of the Army of the Centre had been holding. Foy set out to fulfil these orders on November 22.