A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
There were now 8,000 or 9,000 enemies in this quarter, still quite
close to Madrid, and Joseph and Jourdan had to come to a difficult
decision. If a garrison were left in Madrid, and a strong column sent
to evict Elio from his position, the Army of the Centre would have few
troops left who could follow Soult in the pursuit of Wellington. But
if the whole Army of the Centre marched by the Guadarrama, there was
nothing to prevent Elio from coming down to reoccupy Madrid, and the
political effect of the evacuation of the capital would be detestable,
for it would look as if the whole French army was but a flying column
incapable of holding what it had won[137]. After some hesitation
the King and Jourdan resolved that the military necessity of taking
forward every available man to crush Wellington was all-important. If
Soult alone joined the Army of Portugal in Old Castile the French in
this direction would not outnumber the combined forces of Wellington
and Hill, and might be brought to a stand--perhaps even beaten. The
20,000 men of the Cuenca column must be brought forward at all costs
to secure a numerical superiority for the French arms in the North.
Madrid therefore must be abandoned, and the infantry of the King’s army
marched out of it on the 6th and 8th November, Palombini bringing up
the rear once more. Even the sick and Joseph’s Spanish courtiers had to
be taken on, with a comfortless assurance that they might in the end
be dropped at Valladolid[138]. On the 8th the leading division of the
Army of the Centre reached Villacastin by forced marches, the rear
did not get up till the 10th[139]. Thus it is clear that on November
5th, when Hill executed his flank movement on Fontiveros and Peñaranda,
there was nothing near him save Soult’s advanced cavalry, supported at
an interval by the infantry of the Army of the South, while the Army of
the Centre had not even left Madrid. If Wellington had but known this,
it might have brought about a change in his orders; but--as cannot too
often be repeated--the ‘fog of war’ sometimes lies very thick around a
general at the moment when he has to make his crucial decision, and on
these two days the enemy _might_ have been closed up, instead of being
strung out in detachments over a hundred miles of mountain roads. A
few days after the French left Madrid the Empecinado came down to the
capital and occupied it--Elio had gone off, according to Wellington’s
original orders, to place himself in communication with the Army of
Andalusia (now no longer under Ballasteros) and took post in La Mancha.
Bassecourt reoccupied Cuenca. There was not a French soldier left in
New Castile, and all communication between Soult and King Joseph on one
side and Suchet in Valencia on the other, were completely broken off.
SECTION XXXIV: CHAPTER V
THE BURGOS RETREAT. THE OPERATIONS ROUND SALAMANCA. NOVEMBER 1-NOVEMBER
15, 1812
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