A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Meanwhile, from a comparatively early hour on the 15th it became
evident that Soult was not going to play the game that Wellington
desired. It was a miserable morning of drifting rain, and
reconnaissances had to be pushed far forward to get any clear
information. But the reports soon began to come in, to the effect that
the enemy was keeping closed up, that he was constructing trenches and
_abattis_ on the heights of Mozarbes[180] and that he had pushed out
an immense force of cavalry on his left wing, under cover of which
infantry divisions were clearly to be seen working westward. Evidently
Soult was aiming at the roads toward Ciudad Rodrigo; but he was not
(like Marmont on July 22) letting his army break up into unconnected
sections, and was keeping it in an unbroken line. The entrenchments
on the hills showed that he was prepared to receive in position any
frontal attack that Wellington might be prepared to direct against
him. His motions were slow, not only because of his cautious method of
procedure, but from the badness of the country roads, already made deep
and miry from the rain, over which he was moving his left wing towards
the west. The Army of Portugal was now in line on his right, and its
cavalry was feeling its way forward towards Hill’s flank. But obviously
the danger was not on this side, where the bulk of the French infantry
was standing fast in position: it was the other wing, Soult’s troops
alone, which was in decided motion, and that for a flank march, not for
anything approaching a frontal attack.
All this was most disappointing: Wellington at once made up his mind
that since the enemy was not about to attack his position, and since
it would be madness on his part to take the offensive and assail the
well-placed array of the French, there was no alternative save instant
retreat. It must not be delayed, because, when Soult should have moved
his left wing a little farther on, he would be controlling the road
that runs from Mozarbes to Tamames and Ciudad Rodrigo, parallel to
that via Matilla and San Muñoz to the same destination, over which
Wellington’s natural line of retreat lay.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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