A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
On December 12th he started out to deal with the Cadiz bureaucrats,
planning to cover the whole 300 miles from Freneda in six days. As
a matter of fact he took eleven, partly because he was smitten with
lumbago, which made riding painful, partly because he was delayed
one night in the Pass of Perales, and two at Albuquerque, by floods,
which made mountain-streams impassable for many hours. Immediately on
reaching the seat of government, where he was received with great state
if with little real cordiality, he started on his campaign against the
Regency, the Cortes, and the Minister of War. It is much to the credit
of the Spaniards that, though many of his demands were unpalatable, the
greater part of them were conceded with slight variation of terms. It
is curious to note the points on which the Regency proved recalcitrant
and started argument. Of the four great preliminary conditions which
Wellington exacted, they granted at once that which seemed the most
important of all--the creation of a Spanish chief-of-the-staff to be
attached to Wellington’s head-quarters, and conceded that all military
correspondence should pass through his hands. The person selected was
General Wimpffen, a Spanish-Swiss officer, of whom we have had to speak
occasionally in dealing with Catalonian affairs--he had been Henry
O’Donnell’s adjutant-general in 1810. He was a non-political soldier
of good abilities, and Wellington found him laborious and obliging:
there seems never to have been any friction between them. Secondly, the
Regency granted the great point that the whole British subsidy should
be applied to such military expenses as Wellington should designate:
and they afterwards went so far as to order that in the recovered
provinces nine-tenths of the taxes raised should be devoted to military
purposes. But they haggled on the two conditions dealing with military
patronage. Instead of giving the generalissimo power to revise all
appointments, they proposed that ‘no officer should be promoted to
a chief command, or the command of a division, or any extraordinary
command, except at the recommendation of the general-in-chief. With
regard to other promotions the rules of the Spanish service shall
be strictly observed.’ This left all patronage from the rank of
brigadier-general downward in the hands of the Minister of War and the
Cortes. And whereas Wellington had proposed, as his second condition,
that he should have power to cashier any officer whom he considered
deserving of such punishment, the Regents offered him only the right of
suspending and sending away from the army in the field officers guilty
of grave misconduct[280].
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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