A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The same question that arose about the King’s German Legion also came
up during the spring of 1813 with regard to the Brunswickers. Many
officers of the Brunswick-Oels battalion in the 7th Division were fired
with the idea of liberating Germany--they wrote to their duke, then in
England, begging him to have the battalion ordered home. He replied
that he had tried to get the War Office to let him go to the Elbe, even
with a small cadre, a few hundred men, but had been refused[315]. It is
much more surprising that this corps was not spared from the Peninsula:
Wellington had a bad mark against it, for its terrible propensity to
desertion, and a worse for the behaviour of one of its companies at
Tordesillas in the recent campaign. Probably he thought that, if he
surrendered the Brunswickers, he would have to give up the German
Legion also.
It is odd to find that among Wellington’s troubles were not only the
proposed subtraction of troops whom he did not want to lose, but the
proposed addition of troops whom he was not at all anxious to see in
the Peninsula. The story is one which illustrates the casual methods
of Russian officers. In February there came to Freneda a well-known
British secret agent, Mackenzie, the man who had organized the
successful evasion of La Romana’s Spaniards from Denmark in 1808[316].
He brought letters from Admiral Greig, commanding the Russian Black
Sea fleet, to the effect that there was a surplus of troops from
Tchitchagoff’s Army of the Danube, which could not be utilized in
Germany for want of transport and supplies. There were 15,000 men who
could be collected at Odessa and shipped to Spain, to be placed in the
Allied Army, if Wellington would accept them. The memory of Russian
co-operation in Holland in 1799 was not a very happy one: but it seemed
unwise to offend the Tsar, on whose goodwill the future of Europe now
depended. Wherefore the answer given was that they might come if the
British Cabinet approved, and if the Spanish and Portuguese governments
saw no objection. ‘One would think that the Emperor had demands enough
for his men,’ wrote Wellington to Charles Stuart, ‘but Mackenzie says
that they have more men than they can support in the field, which is
not improbable. The admission of Russians into the Peninsula, however,
is quite a new feature of the war: and it is absolutely necessary
that the allied Governments should consent to the measure[317].’ The
correspondence with Cadiz and London ended in the most tiresome and
ridiculous fashion--the Spanish Regency was at the moment in a state
of diplomatic tension with Russia, on some questions of precedence and
courtesy. It answered in the most downright fashion that the presence
of Russian troops in Spain would be neither helpful nor welcome. The
British ambassador at Cadiz was shocked at the language used, which
would be most offensive to the Tsar[318]. But the whole project
suddenly collapsed on news received from London. Count Lieven, the
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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