A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the PyreneesOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 6, September 1, 1812-August 5, 1813 : $b The siege of Burgos, the retreat from Burgos, the campaign of Vittoria, the battles of the Pyrenees
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
Suchet accordingly resolved to try the hazardous experiment of
preserving his old positions, even when communication with Madrid had
been cut off. He left on his inland flank only a flying brigade or
two, and the normal garrisons of the small fortified towns of upper
Aragon, and kept his main striking force still concentrated on the
line of the Xucar, in order to cover the plain of Valencia from the
one serious enemy, the Alicante army. The available troops consisted
of the three small infantry divisions of Habert, Harispe, and Musnier
(this last temporarily under Robert), and the cavalry division of
Boussard, the whole amounting to about 12,500 foot and 1,500 horse,
or a gross total of all arms of some 15,000 men. They were disposed
so as to cover the front of 50 miles from Moxente, at the foot of the
Murcian mountains, to the mouth of the Xucar, and were not scattered
in small parties, but concentrated in four groups which could easily
unite. The right wing was covered by an entrenched camp at Moxente, the
centre by another at San Felipe de Xativa. Denia on the sea-coast was
held as a cover to the left wing. Cavalry was out in front, and in a
rather exposed position a brigade of Habert’s division held Alcoy, a
considerable town in a fertile upland valley, whose resources Suchet
was anxious to retain as long as possible.
Soon after he had taken over command at Alicante on February 25th,
Murray obtained accurate local information as to the exact distribution
and numbers of the French, and noting the very exposed position of
the brigade at Alcoy, made an attempt to cut it off by the concentric
advance of four columns. The scheme failed, partly because of the late
arrival of the right-hand column (a brigade of Whittingham’s division),
partly because Murray, having got engaged with the French in front,
refused to support his advanced troops until the flanking detachments
should appear, and so allowed the enemy to slip away (March 6th)[405].
He then halted, though his movement must obviously have roused Suchet’s
attention, and rendered a counter-attack possible. But after a week,
finding the enemy still passive, he sent forward Whittingham to drive
the French outposts from Consentaina, and the pass of Albeyda, in the
mountain range which separates the valley of Alcoy from the lowland.
This was to ask for trouble, and should only have been done if Murray
was proposing to challenge Suchet to a decisive general action:
Whittingham indeed thought that this was the object of his commanding
officer[406]. At the same time two British battalions under General
Donkin made a demonstration against the French right, ten miles farther
east, in the direction of Onteniente. Habert, whose whole division was
holding the line of hills, gave way after a sharp skirmish, and allowed
Whittingham to seize the pass of Albeyda (March 15th). Every one
supposed that the Alicante army was now about to attack the French main
position between Moxente and Xativa.
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