The downfall of what had been considered the chief military nation of Europe was due to many involved causes. The Empire was responsible for the _débâcle_ and the Government of National Defence was unable to create everything out of nothing. Many people were ready to be discouraged after a first defeat, and few realized what Germany's demands were going to be. The imperial army was insufficiently equipped and the majority of its generals were inefficient and lacking in initiative: there was no preparation, no system, little discipline. During the period of National Defence the members of the Government themselves were usually wanting in experience and in diplomacy, and the badly trained armies made up of raw recruits were liable to panics or unable to follow up an advantage. There was jealousy, mistrust, and frequent unwillingness to subordinate politics to patriotism, or, at any rate, to make allowances for other forms of patriotism than one's own. Gambetta and Jules Favre were primarily orators and tribunes and indulged in too many wordy proclamations, in which habit they were followed by General Trochu. The patriotism and enthusiasm of Gambetta were undeniable, but he was imbued with the principles and memories of the French Revolution, including the efficacy of national volunteers, the ability of France to resist all Europe, and the subordination of military to civil authority. Consequently, in a time of stress he nagged the generals and interfered, and gave free rein to Freycinet to do the same. They upset plans made by experienced generals, and sent civilians to spy over them, with power to retire them from command. They were, moreover, trying to thrust a republic down the throats of a hostile majority of the population, for a large proportion of those not Bonapartists were in favor of a monarchy. The wonder is, therefore, that France was able to do so much. M. de Freycinet was not boasting when he wrote later, "Alone, without allies, without leaders, without an army, deprived for the first time of communication with its capital, it resisted for five months, with improvised resources, a formidable enemy that the regular armies of the Empire, though made up of heroic soldiers, had not been able to hold back five weeks."[3] FOOTNOTES: [1] Moritz Busch, _Bismarck_, vol. 1, chap. 1. [2] He surrendered by order of the Government. The isolated incident of the resistance of the town of Bitche through all the war is no less noteworthy. [3] _La guerre en province_, quoted by Welschinger, _La guerre de 1870_, vol. II, p. 295. CHAPTER III THE ADMINISTRATION OF ADOLPHE THIERS February, 1871, to May, 1873