Such mediævalism dealt the monarchical cause a crushing blow. The Royalists had already begun to look askance at M. Thiers and hinted that his readiness to go on with the Republic was a tacit violation of the Bordeaux Compact. Under the circumstances, however, his sincerity need not be doubted in believing a republic the only outcome, and his ambition or vanity may be excused for wishing to continue its leader. By the Rivet-Vitet measure of August 31, 1871, M. Thiers, hitherto "chief of executive power," was called "President of the French Republic." He was to exercise his functions so long as the Assembly had not completed its work and was to be responsible to the Assembly. Thus the legislative body elected for an emergency was taking upon itself constituent authority and was tending to perpetuate the Republic which the majority disliked. From this time the tension grew greater between Thiers and the Assembly, which begrudged him the credit for the negotiations still proceeding, and already mentioned above, for the evacuation of France by the Germans. It thwarted the wish of the Republicans to transfer the seat of the executive and legislature to Paris. Thiers was, indeed, working away from the Bordeaux Compact and was advocating a republic, though a conservative one. This "treachery" the monarchists could not forgive, though bye-elections were constantly increasing the Republican membership. Thiers did not, on the other hand, welcome the advanced republicanism of Gambetta declaring war on clericalism, and proclaiming the advent of a new "social stratum" (_une couche sociale nouvelle_) for the government of the nation. By the middle of 1872, Thiers was the open advocate of "la République conservatrice," and this gradual transformation of a transitional republic into a permanent one was what the monarchists could not accept. So they declared open war on M. Thiers. On November 29, 1872, a committee of thirty was appointed at Thiers's instigation to regulate the functions of public authority and the conditions of ministerial responsibility. This was inevitably another step toward the affirmation of a permanent republic by the clearer specification of governmental attributes. The majority of the committee were hostile to M. Thiers and were determined to overthrow him. The Left was also growing dissatisfied with his opposition to a dissolution. He found it increasingly difficult to ride two horses. The committee of thirty wished to prevent Thiers from exercising pressure on the Assembly by intervention in debates and threats to resign. In February and March, 1873, it proposed that the President should notify the Assembly by message of his intention to speak, and the ensuing discussion was not to take place in his presence. M. Thiers protested in vain against this red tape (_chinoiseries_). The effect was to drive him more and more from the Assembly, where his personal influence might be felt.