A History, of the War of 1812-15 Between the United States and Great BritainJohnson, Rossiter
History
A History, of the War of 1812-15 Between the United States and Great Britain
Johnson, Rossiter
United States -- History -- War of 1812
prove strong enough to win in the end, unless interference by some other
power prevents it; while a nation that is too weak to keep war, with
all its devastation and ruin, out of its territory, must certainly be
defeated unless assisted by some neighboring people. The invaders
may, and probably will, lose the greater number of men in the pitched
battles; but it is not their harvests that will be trampled, not their
mills that will be burned, not their bridges that will be blown up, not
their homes that will be desolated, not their families that must fly
for shelter to the caves and the forests. Their sources of supply are
untouched. This principle was recognized by Scipio, when he declared
that the war with Carthage "must be carried into Africa." {026}As
England claimed to be mistress of the seas, and practically the claim
was almost true, the determination to send our little navy and a fleet
of privateers against her was essentially carrying the war into English
territory. And as this part of the contest was conducted with skill and
valor, it was gloriously successful.
An invasion of Canada being determined upon, the first question that
necessarily arose was, at what point that country should first be
attacked. To any one not skilled in military science the most obvious
plan would seem the best--to march as large a force as possible, without
delay, into Canada at the nearest point. A young officer, Major Jesup,
of Kentucky, sent a memorial to the Secretary of War, in which he set
forth a totally different plan from this. He proposed that a strong
expedition should be fitted out to capture and hold Halifax, which was
then a city of fifteen thousand inhabitants, with the most important
harbor in the Canadian provinces. As a precedent, he could refer to the
capture of Louis-burg in 1748. But the Secretary, Hon. William Eustis,
of Massachusetts, spoke of it contemptuously as "a very pretty plan,"
and set it aside. Yet it was sound in principle, and if properly carried
out could hardly have failed to secure important results. In striking an
enemy on the flank, it is {027}always desirable, to choose that flank
by which he holds communication with his base. A blow on the other
flank may inflict injury, but it only drives him back toward his base. A
movement that cuts him off from such communication compels him either
to surrender or to fight at great disadvantage Canada's base--for many
supplies, and largely for soldiers--was England. The port of Quebec
was frozen up nearly half the year, and the occupation of Halifax by
an American force would have gone far toward severing the connection
between the provinces and the mother country. That harbor, too, was
all-important for the refuge and refitting of British naval vessels on
this side of the Atlantic.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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