A Letter to Grover Cleveland: On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and Servitude Of The PeopleSpooner, Lysander
Philosophy
A Letter to Grover Cleveland: On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People
Spooner, Lysander
Cleveland, Grover, 1837-1908; United States -- Politics and government
_The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or
silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when
the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal
intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a
contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall
recognize as money when the payment is to be made.--Legal
Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548._
This is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an
obligation to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money,
_at the time when the contract is made_, but only such substitute as
congress shall afterwards prescribe, "_when the payment is to be made_."
This opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870.
In another opinion the court says:
Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value,
congress may issue coins of same denomination [that is, bearing
the same name] as those already current by law, but of less
intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less
weight of the precious metals, _and thereby enable debtors to
discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real
value_. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any
stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be made,
may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that is, that
_nominal_ amount] in any currency _which is lawful money at the
place and time at which payment is to be made_.--_Juilliard vs.
Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_, 449.
This opinion was given by the entire court--save one, Field--at the
October term of 1883.
Both these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress
to alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by simply retaining the
name, while altering the thing, that is agreed to be paid.
In both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, _after the
parties to a contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be
paid_, congress has power to reduce the value of the dollar, and
authorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, instead of the
one agreed on.
In other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been
made for the payment of a certain number of dollars, _congress has power
to alter the meaning of the word dollar_, and thus authorize the debtor
to pay in something different from, and less valuable than, the thing he
agreed to pay.
Well, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, _after they are
made_, by altering the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the
value of the debt, it has a precisely equal power to _increase_ the
value of the dollar, and thus compel the debtor to pay _more_ than he
agreed to pay.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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