Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtIsI, fElAptOn, bOkArdO,** fErlsO, habet; quarta insuper addit. Fig. 4. brAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArIs, fEsApo, frEsIsOn. A motley group, too numerous to be particularised, bring up the complex rear of 'Modals,' 'Hypotheticals,' 'Conditionals,' and 'Disjunctives.' This is certainly not the portal through which the populace can at present pass to logic, even if such logic helped them to all truth, and saved them from all fallacy. But this species of logic is not without interest. Symbolic letters and mnemonic lines are not without attractions to those who understand them. There is poetry in an algebraic sign, when it is the emblem of a difficulty solved, and a wonderful result simply arrived at. To try the whole power of words, and discover every form of language in which a legitimate deduction can be expressed, is no ignoble task. It is a high discipline, but it belongs rather to the age of leisure than this of 'copperasfames, cotton-fuz, gin-riot, wrath, and toil'--to the luxuries rather than the utilities of learning. There is the inefficiency of the syllogism, and also the vitiation produced by its employment. 1. It corrupts the taste for philosophical invention by placing philosophy in abstractions, and withdrawing it from the observation of nature. 2. It creates a reliance on principles, which originate in the _hypotheses_ of philosophers, not in the laws of nature. 3. It makes truth the result of the forms of argument, not of scientific evidence.*** * Or, Fakoro, as indeed all the particulars in this place recited. ** Or, Dokamo. but a brief summary of the subjects comprised in his logic in reference to the syllogism. ***Bruce. These references to Fakoro and Dokamo are Whately's. Lord Kames cites from the father of logic the following syllogism, which will bear repetition as an extraordinary instance of that assumption for which the Logic of the Schools provides no remedy:-- Heavy bodies naturally tend to the centre of the universe. We know, by experience, that heavy bodies tend to the centre of the earth. Therefore the centre of the earth is the centre of the universe. But by what experience did Aristotle discover the centre of the universe, so as to become aware that heavy bodies _naturally_ tend there? On what facts rest the measurement of the radii from our earth to the boundless circumference of space? How did he ascertain the limits of that which has no limits? Yet, strange to say, the Logic of the Schools prides itself in leaving us where the Stagyrite left us. 'When mankind began to reason on the phenomena of nature, they were solicitous to _abstract_, and they formed general propositions from a _limited_ observation. Though these propositions were assumed, they were admitted as true. They were not examined _by appeals to nature_, but by comparison with other propositions.'*