A Logic of Facts; Or, Every-day ReasoningHolyoake, George Jacob
Philosophy
A Logic of Facts; Or, Every-day Reasoning
Holyoake, George Jacob
Logic
It is not 'some fallacy in the syllogistic reasoning' which Bacon is
supposed to have detected, it is rather the partial protection against
error afforded by syllogisms, which he exposed and provided against,
for which he is estimated. Certainly Aristotle must have had a very
different opinion of the value of inductive philosophy from that
entertained by Bacon, or he would have indoctrinated his disciples with
it. Few will doubt that had Bacon's Novum Organon appeared in the place
of Aristotle's logic, and Aristotle's work in the place of Bacon's,
that the advancement of learning in the world would now be in a very
different state. Could Bacon have arrested the attention of the
ancient sages with his methods of discovering new principles, ancient
philosophy, instead of being a treadmill, would have been a path, and we
should not have had a contempt for all learning which was useful. When
Posidonius said that we owed to philosophy the principles of the
arch and the introduction of metals. We should not have had Seneca
repudiating such insulting compliments, nor Archimedes considering that
geometry was degraded by being employed in anything useful.
But these observations of Macaulay have the merit of showing us
that induction has its foundation in nature, and afford a further
confirmation of our views, that observation is the source of our
knowledge, and that it is the province of logic to teach us to
systematise our thoughts. Observation, experiment, hypothesis and
induction, are but different names for the operation--varying in degree,
in method, in expedient, and elaboration--whereby we discover truth.
Nature is the treasure-house of truth, and the sole fee of appropriation
is attention.
Much discussion has taken place upon the nature of necessary truths.
Mr. Mill, however, after an elaborate analysis of Dr. Whewell's theory,
pronounces that 'nothing is necessary except the connection between a
conclusion and the premises.' A necessary truth is commonly defined as a
proposition, the negation of which is not only false, but inconceivable.
Mr. Mill contests this doctrine in words embodying suggestions of great
value.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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