A Manual of Moral PhilosophyPeabody, Andrew P. (Andrew Preston)
Philosophy
A Manual of Moral Philosophy
Peabody, Andrew P. (Andrew Preston)
Ethics
Every object, by virtue of its existence, has its *appropriate place,
purpose, uses, and relations*. At every moment, each specific object is
either in or out of its place, fulfilling or not fulfilling its purpose,
subservient to or alienated from its uses, in accordance or out of harmony
with its relations, and therefore in a state of _fitness_ or _unfitness_
as regards other objects. Every object is at every moment under the
control of the intelligent will of the Supreme Being, or of some finite
being, and is by that will maintained either in or out of its place,
purpose, uses, or relations, and thus in a state of fitness or unfitness
with regard to other objects. Every intelligent being, by virtue of his
existence, bears certain definite relations to outward objects, to his
fellow-beings, and to his Creator. At every moment, each intelligent being
is either faithful or unfaithful to these relations, and thus in a state
of fitness or unfitness as regards outward objects and other beings. Thus
fitness or unfitness may be affirmed, at every moment, of every object in
existence, of the volition by which each object is controlled, and of
every intelligent being, with regard to the exercise of his will toward or
upon outward objects or his fellow-beings. Fitness and unfitness are the
ultimate ideas that are involved in the terms _right_ and _wrong_. These
last are metaphorical terms,—right (Latin, _rectus_), straight, upright,
according to rule, and therefore _fit_; wrong, _wrung_, distorted,
deflected, twisted out of place, contrary to rule, and therefore _unfit_.
We are so constituted that we cannot help regarding fitness with
complacency and esteem; unfitness, with disesteem and disapproval, even
though we ourselves create it or impersonate it.
*Fitness* is the only standard by which we regard our own actions or the
actions of others as good or evil,—by which we justify or condemn
ourselves or others. Duty has fitness for its only aim and end. To
whatever object comes under our control, its fit place, purpose, uses, and
relations are _due_; and our perception of what is thus due constitutes
our _duty_, and awakens in us a sense of obligation. To ourselves, and to
other beings and objects, our fidelity to our relations has in it an
intrinsic fitness; that fitness is _due_ to them and to ourselves; and our
perception of what is thus due constitutes our _duty_, and awakens in us a
sense of obligation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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