A Philosophical Essay on ProbabilitiesLaplace, Pierre Simon, marquis de
Philosophy
A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities
Laplace, Pierre Simon, marquis de
Probabilities
A single number has been drawn from an urn which contains a thousand of
them. A witness to this drawing announces that number 79 is drawn; one
asks the probability of drawing this number. Let us suppose that
experience has made known that this witness deceives one time in ten, so
that the probability of his testimony is 1/10. Here the event observed
is the witness attesting that number 79 is drawn. This event may result
from the two following hypotheses, namely: that the witness utters the
truth or that he deceives. Following the principle that has been
expounded on the probability of causes drawn from events observed it is
necessary first to determine _à priori_ the probability of the event in
each hypothesis. In the first, the probability that the witness will
announce number 79 is the probability itself of the drawing of this
number, that is to say, 1/1000. It is necessary to multiply it by the
probability 6/10 of the veracity of the witness; one will have then
9/10000 for the probability of the event observed in this hypothesis. If
the witness deceives, number 79 is not drawn, and the probability of
this case is 999/1000. But to announce the drawing of this number the
witness has to choose it among the 999 numbers not drawn; and as he is
supposed to have no motive of preference for the ones rather than the
others, the probability that he will choose number 79 is 1/999;
multiplying, then, this probability by the preceding one, we shall have
1/1000 for the probability that the witness will announce number 79 in
the second hypothesis. It is necessary again to multiply this
probability by 1/10 of the hypothesis itself, which gives 1/10000 for
the probability of the event relative to this hypothesis. Now if we form
a fraction whose numerator is the probability relative to the first
hypothesis, and whose denominator is the sum of the probabilities
relative to the two hypotheses, we shall have, by the sixth principle,
the probability of the first hypothesis, and this probability will be
9/10; that is to say, the veracity itself of the witness. This is
likewise the probability of the drawing of number 79. The probability of
the falsehood of the witness and of the failure of drawing this number
is 1/10.
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