only lawful, but honorable and meritorious, in any subject to slay or cause to be slain a traitor and disloyal tyrant, especially when he is a man of such mighty power that justice cannot well be done by the sovereign.” This principle once laid down, John Petit proceeded to apply it to the Duke of Burgundy, “causing to be slain that criminal tyrant, the Duke of Orleans, who was meditating the damnable design of thrusting aside the king and his children from their crown;” and he drew from it the conclusion that “the Duke of Burgundy ought not to be at all blamed or censured for what had happened in the person of the Duke of Orleans, and that the king not only ought not to be displeased with him, but ought to hold the said lord of Burgundy, as well as his deed, agreeable to him, and authorized by necessity.” The defence thus concluded, letters were actually put before the king, running thus: “It is our will and pleasure that our cousin of Burgundy, his heirs and successors, be and abide at peace with us and our successors, in respect of the aforesaid deed, and all that hath followed thereon; and that by us, our said successors, our people and officers, no hinderance, on account of that, may be offered them, either now or in time to come.” Charles VI., weak in mind and will, even independently of his attacks, signed these letters, and gave Duke John quite a kind reception, telling him, however, that “he could cancel the penalty, but not the resentment of everybody, and that it was for him to defend himself against perils which were probably imminent.” The duke answered proudly that “so long as he stood in the king’s good graces, he did not fear any man living.”