The last occupation I shall notice is that of a silversmith. And here the censure will depend upon a contingency also. If a Quaker confines himself to the selling of plain silver articles for use, little objection can be raised against his employ. But if, in addition to this, he sells goldheaded canes, trinkets, rings, ear-rings, bracelets, jewels, and other ornaments of the person, he will be considered as chargeable with the same inconsistency as the follower of the former trade. In examining these and other occupations of the Quakers, with a view of seeing how far the objections which have been advanced against them are valid, I own I have a difficult task to perform. For what standard shall I fix upon, or what limits shall I draw upon this occasion? The objections are founded in part upon the principle, that Quakers ought not to sell those things, of which their own practice shows that they disapprove. But shall I admit this principle without any limitation or reserve? Shall I say without any reserve, that a Quaker-woman, who discards the use of a simple ribbon from her dress, shall not sell it to another female, who has been constantly in the habit of using it, and this without any detriment to her mind? Shall I say again, without any reserve, that a Quaker-man who discards the use of black cloth, shall not sell a yard of it to another? And, if I should say so, where am I to stop? Shall I not be obliged to go over all the colours in his shop, and object to all but the brown and the drab? Shall I say again, without any reserve, that a Quaker cannot sell any thing which is innocent in itself, without inquiring of the buyer its application or its use? And if I should say so, might I not as well say, that no Quaker can be in trade? I fear that to say this, would be to get into a labyrinth, out of which there would be no clew to guide us. Difficult, however, as the task may seem, I think I may lay down three positions, which will probably not be denied, and which, if admitted, will assist us in the determination of the question before us. The first of these is, that no Quaker can be concerned in the sale of a thing, which is evil in itself. Secondly, that he cannot encourage the sale of an article, which he knows to be essentially, or very generally, that is, in seven cases out of ten, productive of evil. And, thirdly, that he cannot sell things which he has discarded from his own use, if he has discarded them on a belief that they are specifically forbidden by Christianity, or that they are morally injurious to the human mind. If these positions be acknowledged, they will give ample latitude for the condemnation of many branches of trade. A Quaker-bookseller, according to these positions, cannot sell a profane or improper book. A Quaker spirit-merchant cannot sell his liquor but to those whom he believes will use it in moderation, or medicinally, or on proper occasions.