3. In our enquiry into the practical working of the moral sense, we found, not only that there were motives of action employed for encouraging the pupil to virtue, and for deterring him from vice; but we found also, that these motives referred chiefly to God, to a future judgment, and to eternity. In our attempts to imitate Nature in this particular feature of her dealing with the moral sense, we begin more distinctly to perceive the high value of Religious Instruction to the young, and are led directly to the conclusion, that the motives to be employed with children for encouraging and rewarding good conduct, must be those chiefly of a spiritual kind, referring to God, and to his favour or disapprobation, rather than to the rod, or to any secular reward. The importance of imitating Nature in this matter, for giving a high tone both to the sentiments and to the morals of the young, is very great. It is now generally admitted, that secular, and especially corporal punishments, are never required, except in connection with a very low and degraded state of the moral sentiments; but it is equally correct with respect to secular rewards for moral actions. They may both of them at times be necessary, but in that case they are necessary evils; and, as a class of motives, they should never be the rule, but invariably the exception.--We must not, however, be misunderstood. We are no more for abandoning _secular rewards_, than we are for giving up corporal punishments. We speak not here of their _abandonment_, but of their _enlightened regulation_;--both of them may be of service. But what we wish to point out as an important feature in moral training is, that they are, or should be, but seldom necessary; and that they ought never to be resorted to except when they really are so. The differences observable in the results arising from _secular_, and those from _moral_ motives, are very different, both as regards their power in restraining from vice, and their influence in stimulating to virtue. What, for example, would we think of the moral condition of a child, or of the virtue of his actions, if he had to be hired by a comfit, or a piece of money, to do every act of kindness which he performed; or if he refused to relieve a sister, or prevent an injury to his companion, unless similarly rewarded? This secular spirit in morals, when thus exposed in its deformity, is obnoxious to every sentiment of virtue, and shews itself to be a mere system of buying and selling. But how very different does the reward appear, and the feeling which it excites, when that reward assumes the moral character, and is found to be the desire of pleasing the parent, and much more when it seeks the approbation of the Almighty? Every one will see how beneficial and elevating the effects of cherishing the one must be, and how debasing comparatively is the influence of the other. That children are capable of being acted upon by